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Abstract
This paper examines the potential for using the results of studies
of wage-risk premiums for hazardous jobs to estimate the benefits of
reductions in low-level environmental risks. An economic model of risk
reduction is developed that intuitively relates the benefits of reductions
in environmental risks to risk reduction in the workplace. Inherent
biases in the wage-risk premiums are considered and shown to be downward
biased estimates of benefits. We conclude with an example that considers
the potential benefits of not allowing a partial conversion of the U.S.
light-duty vehicle fleet to diesel-powered engines.
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1I: Introduction
There has been a growing trend since the mid 1970s toward the requirement
of comprehensive analyses of the economic impacts of proposed government
regulations. This trend is evidenced most recently by the issuance of
Executive Order 12,291 (E.O. 12,291) in 1981. The primary thrust of
E.O. 12,291 is that federal administrative agencies conduct a benefit-cost
analysis of all proposed and existing major regulations to evaluate the
net social benefits that those regulations can be expected to generate.
While the goal of Executive Order 12,291 is certainly commendable
from the perspective of efficiency, it ignores the problem of attaching a
dollar measure to the benefits from a proposed regulation that are non-market
in nature. We are concerned with how one might attach a preliminary value
to the benefits from a regulation that reduces the level of a given risk
to human life. The focus is on low-level environmental risks; a subject
of much of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory activities.
This paper examines the potential for using results from studies of
the value of wage-risk premiums in the labor market to establish a lower
bound on the monetary benefits realized from reducing a particular low-level
environmental risk.l The use of these estimates could greatly facilitate
the timely evaluation of alternative policies designed to mitigate such
risks while adhering to the spirit of the requirements of E.O. 12,291.
For example, these estimates could be used to select a subset of the most
promising alternatives to a given problem that could then be analyzed in
more rigorous detail. Additionally, if the estimates considered here are
downward biased for a given reduction in environmental risks and costs
are accurately measured, then policies legitimized via a cost-benefit

2analysis utilizing these figures would have a reasonably high probability
of being correct.
Part II begins with a discussion of the nature of low-level environ-
mental risks. A simple model is then developed that identifies the equi-
librium condition for achieving an efficient reduction in a given low-level
environmental risk and the applicability of the estimates considered in
Part III is discussed. Part III considers recent efforts to place a value
on the wage premium required for an individual to accept a specific prob-
ability of death. In Part IV the approach to benefits estimation outlined
here is applied to a specific situation. Part V summarizes the analysis
and conclusions are offered.
II: The Nature of Low-Level Environmental Risks
From the policymaker's perspective low-level environmental risks—those
associated with the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes, the release of
toxics from an industrial site, pesticides, etc.
—
pose a particularly
difficult problem. In the absence of specific guidelines, it is not clear
what objective should be pursued vis-a-vis reducing such risks. One alter-
native is to pursue policies that will reduce those risks below a pre-
determined threshold level. Risk levels falling below this "De Minimis"
level are assumed to have a minimal impact on society's general level of
well-being. From the economist's perspective, this "De Minimis" approach
to risk reduction is flawed because it ignores the fundamental rule of
economic efficiency, i.e., actions should only be pursued up to the point
where the marginal benefits realized equal the marginal costs incurred.
Additionally, such an approach ignores the requirements of E.O. 12,291.
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level of risk reduction in the context of environmental risks has been
assailed as being impractical if not simply impossible to achieve (Office
of Technology Assessment, 1983).
The primary problem cited concerns the estimation of the monetary
benefits realized when a particular risk is reduced by some amount. This
problem stems from two factors. The first factor concerns the technical
difficulties encountered in attempts to measure the level of a specific
risk, i.e., risk assessment. As an example, it is presently quite difficult
to establish the risk associated with disposing of a particular hazardous
waste stream in landfills (Fisher, 1983). The second factor is the general
unavailability of precise estimates of the dollar value that individuals
attach to reductions in low-level environmental risks.
Quantitatively, low-level environmental risks can be conveniently
characterized as the probability of certain adverse effects occurring,
e.g., mortality, morbidity, and environmental damage as a result of the
presence of some toxic substance in the environment (Carlson, 1984; Smith
and Desvousges, 1983b). In general, the probability of realizing some
adverse effect from a given environmental risk is the product of a series
of temporally arranged "intermediate" probabilities. Consider the following
example. The risk posed by the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes can
be characterized as a function of a series of events, each occurring with
probability P(i) where i refers to the event in question. In order of
occurrence the events are failure, contamination, exposure, and the receiving
of a dose of the toxic substance in question in excess of some threshold
level necessary to induce an adverse effect. These events interact to
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morbidity, and environmental damage. The probability of, say, mortality
can be written as:
(1) P(M) = P(F)-P(C|F).P(E|C,F)-P(T|E,C,F)
where M is mortality, F is failure, C is contamination, E is exposure,
and T is exposure in excess of the threshold level necessary to induce
mortality. We can further distinguish between the probability of mortality
(or any adverse effect) in the near term, say one year, and the probability
of mortality more than one year from now (Carlson, 1984). This recognizes
the fact that many environmental hazards pose a substantial threat to
both current and future generations .2
Inspection of Equation (1) suggests that in many instances the probab-
ility of some adverse occurrence may be quite small. Additionally, the
estimated value of each of the intermediate probabilities possesses an
associated degree of error, increasing the degree of error associated
with the ultimate probability of interest. These problems directly affect
the estimated monetary benefits of any reduction in risk.
The task then of assessing the monetary benefits realized from reductions
in low-level environmental risks is a formidable one. However, a con-
siderable amount of work has been undertaken to address both facets of
the problem just described. In the case of risk assessment, for example,
the U.S. EPA has sponsored research to develop methods for assessing the
risks associated with the use of various methods for the disposal of hazardous
wastes (ICF, Inc., 1984). With respect to the valuation of reductions in
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have provided analyses of the theoretical and empirical aspects of individ-
uals' willingness to pay. The results of these studies suggest that with
additional work it will be possible to gain meaningful insights into individ-
uals' valuations of reductions in a variety of low-level environmental risks.
Modeling the Benefits and Costs of Risk Reduction
Where society determines that an environmental risk is unacceptable
the question is how much should the risk be reduced. With respect to
economic efficiency, that question is answered by examining the marginal
benefits and costs of risk reduction. Owing to the indivisible and non-
excludable character of reductions in low-level environmental risks resulting
from specific policies these reductions constitute a public good. From
the policymaker's perspective the marginal benefits of a given reduction
in risk are therefore equal to the sum of the affected individuals' marginal
willingness to pay for the reduction in risk realized. In order to achieve
an efficient solution, risk reduction should be pursued up to the point
where the marginal benefits summed just equal the marginal costs incurred.
It has been shown elsewhere that under a reasonable set of assumptions the
reduction in risk will entail increased production costs for the firms
generating those risks and consequently the costs of risk reduction are
equal to the lost consumer and producer surplus in that market (Carlson,
Johnson, and Ulen, 1984).
Most models of utility maximization where risk is a variable make
use of the expected utility framework. However, use of the expected utility
function has recently come into question based upon empirical observations

6of how individuals behave in certain risk situations. For a discussion
of the related issues, the reader is referred to Schoemaker (1982) and
Weinstein and Quinn (1983). The upshot of this controversy is that in
what follows we treat risk reduction as simply another argument in the
individual's utility function. In a sense then, risk reduction is something
the individual can "purchase." The "price" of risk reduction can be inter-
preted as the value of other goods and services (both private and public)
foregone or wage premiums foregone.
3
We model the benefits and costs of risk reduction as follows. With
respect to benefits, assume that an individual is faced with the following
utility maximization problem:
(2) Max U = U(Q, K, P(M))
s.t. Y = PgQ + P|<K + p pP(M)
where Q is a good, production of which results in some low-level environmental
risk, K is a good not associated with such risks, P(M) is one minus the
probability of mortality associated with the risk in question, Y is income,
and PQ, PK, and pp are the prices of Q, K, and P(M). 4 Combining first
order conditions and solving for pp in Equation (2) yields the following
solution:
(3 ) p = p{6
>
P P P Q U
Q
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The right hand expression
in Equation (3) measures the individual's marginal willingness to pay for
a decrease in the probability of mortality. Additionally, note that

rp*—* is simply the marginal rate of substitution between risk reduction
and good Q. The right side of Equation (3) is therefore the cost, in
terms of the amount of Q given up, of getting one more unit of risk reduction.
Since a reduction in a low-level environmental risk is a public good,
the total benefits of an incremental reduction^ of a given risk are found
by summing the marginal benefits realized across all of the affected individ-
uals (i = 1 ,. . . ,n) , or
n
U
P(M)
i
(4) z pn -j] = Total Benefits.
i = l
4
Q,-
In a competitive market, the costs of risk reduction, as noted above,
are equal to the lost consumer and producer surplus incurred in the market
where the risk is generated. This is based on the assumption that in
order to reduce the risk in question, firms in the affected market will
incur increased production costs, resulting in an upward shift of the
aggregate supply curve. Let the inverse supply curve for a given product,
production of which generates an environmental risk be characterized as:
(5) S = S(Q, W, V,...)
where Q is the quantity of the good, W is a vector of prices of inputs to
the production process, and V is technology. If a policy is then implemented
that forces producers to internalize all or part of the risk they are
generating, the result will be a new supply curve, S*. Assuming that
firms in the affected market operate in a cost minimizing manner, S* will
lie either on top of, or to the left of S.

8The inverse aggregate demand function for the good in question is
assumed to exist and be of the form:
(6) P = P(Q, Y, K, P(M)J
where P is price and Y is income. Combining Equations (5) and (6), the
welfare loss, i.e., loss in producer and consumer surplus, associated
with a policy that forces firms to internalize all or part of the risk in
question is then equal to:
(7)
Q
l [P(Q, Y, K, P(M)) - S(Q, W, V,...)]dQ
Q
2 [P(Q, Y, K, P(M)) - S*(Q, W, V,...)]dQ *
where and Q2 are the pre- and post-policy equilibrium levels of output
respectively. Assuming that the policy results in a reduction in risk of
one "unit", then Equation (7) represents the marginal social cost of that
reduction in risk.
Finally, the equilibrium level of risk reduction is where Equation
(4) is equal to Equation (7) or,
n
U
P(M).
f
Q
]
(8) I p - ]1
- =
i [P(Q, Y, K, P(M)) - S(Q, W, V,...)]dQ
i=l g V OJ
- '[P(Q, Y, K
,
P(M)) - S*(Q, W, V,...)]dQ
J
where S* reflects the additional cost incurred by affected firms in reducing
risk by one "unit"
.

It is quite difficult to gather observations on the marginal rate of
substitution between specific goods and risk reduction. Studies such as
those by Burness, et. al. (1983) have attempted to elicit a value for
risk reduction based on contingent valuation surveys. Alternatively, a
number of studies of the wage premiums associated with risky occupations
have focused on the wil 1 ingness-to-accept compensation for assuming increased
levels of risk on the job. We have chosen to focus on the latter group.
This choice is motivated by two factors. The first is that the wage-risk
premium studies reflect actual behavior with respect to risk. The second
is that contingent valuation surveys may be significantly biased with
respect to actual behavior (Bishop, Heberlein, and Kealy, 1983). In the
context of the theoretical model developed above, use of the wage premium
studies as a reflection of willingness-to-pay for risk reduction requires
an important assumption. The assumption concerns the relationship between
willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA).
With respect to this question, it has been argued elsewhere that WTP and
WTA can be assumed equal subject to certain restrictions (Freeman, 1979).
In fact, most studies that discuss the value of risk in the labor market
treat WTP and WTA as equal (Dillingham, 1984; Violette and Chestnut, 1983).
To the extent that WTP and WTA are equal and wages foregone can be thought
of as representing a decrease in consumption, we then have a good proxy
for Pp'ip^- and hence a measure of p p .
Ill: Previous Studies and Their Applicability
Considerable work has been done on the valuation of the wage premium
required to induce workers to accept an increased risk of work-related
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fatalities. These analyses are summarized in Dillingham (1984), and Violette
and Chestnut (1983). Utilizing data on the wage differentials accruing
to workers in different industries with varying work-related fatality
rates, these studies generate estimates of the additional amount of wages
an individual, or more commonly a group of individuals, will require to
accept an increased probability of a work-related fatality.
Dillingham (1984), considered seven different estimates of the value
of a statistical human life. Noting the considerable variation in the
value-of-life estimates, ranging from $330,000 to $5,390,000 (1979 dollars),
he tested to determine whether the definition of the risk variable in the
different estimates could be assumed to account for at least part of this
variation. Dillingham concluded that the risk variable definition does
appear to have an influence on value-of-risk reduction estimates. Applying
a variety of risk variable definitions to a common set of data on human-
capital and control variables yielded value-of-life estimates ranging
from $1,375,000 to $3,844,000.6 However, while there is still considerable
variation in the value of life estimates generated, this range is much
reduced from that associated with earlier studies, and is used as the
basis for the remainder of our analysis.
7
Based upon Dillingham's estimates, a reduction in the probability
of mortality of (1 x 10~6) has an estimated value ranging from $1.38 to
$3.84 per person Found by multiplying $1 ,375 ,000 and $3,844 ,000 by
(1 x 10 - 6) respectively). Because the value-of-life estimates are based
on annual mortality rates, the value of a reduction in the probability of
mortality can be interpreted as an annual willingness-to-pay for a reduction
in the probability of mortality. This latter point suggests a rough corres-
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pondence between the figures cited here and the valuation of reductions
in the probability of mortality in the near term, i.e., within one year,
as discussed in Part II above.
While the preceding discussion has focused on a reduction in the
probability of mortality of (1 x 10~6) } the value of smaller or larger
reduction in this probability can be similarly estimated. These values
can then be combined with estimates of the relevant population size to
determine the benefits associated with specific policies. Depending
upon the reduction in the probability of death realized via the policy in
question and the estimated size of the relevant population, the lower-
and upper-bound estimates of the value of a given reduction in the probability
of immediate mortality are calculated as:
(9a) LBE = $1 ,375 ,000 x AP x Z
(9b) UBE = $3 ,844 ,447 x AP x Z
where LBE and UBE are the lower- and upper-bound estimates respectively,
AP is the size of the affected population, and Z is the reduction in the
probability of mortality in the near term.
Use of Equations (9a) and (9b) for the value of risk reductions to
be considered here requires an understanding of the biases that may be
introduced through their use. 8 The biases considered include; 1) voluntary
versus involuntary risks, 2) the relationship of the probability of mortality
to low-level environmental risks in general, and 3) the effects of extrap-
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dating values of risk reduction from the estimates in the studies con-
sidered .9
1) Voluntary Versus Involuntary Risks
Low-level environmental risks are usually the result of activities
that are beyond the control of the average individual. As such, any risk
that the individual is subject to as a result of such activities is borne
involuntarily to the extent that the individual cannot force the cessation
of the risk-generating activity. There may be cases where the individual
has chosen to put himself in close proximity to the risk in question.
However, it is assumed here that such instances are rare and that environ-
mental risks are, for the most part, involuntarily assumed. This is in
contrast to the studies which focus on wage differentials for jobs with
varying levels of risk, assumed to be borne voluntarily, as a means of
deriving estimates of the willingness-to-pay for reductions in risk.
The obvious question is whether individuals can be assumed to be willing
to pay the same amount for an equal reduction in a voluntarily-assumed
risk and an involuntarily-assumed risk.
Previous analyses suggest that willingness-to-pay for risk reduction
is context dependent. As an indication of the possible bias in the case
of voluntarily- versus involuntarily-assumed risks, consider the following
example noted in Weinstein and Quinn (1983). Parents have been overwhelmingly
in favor of paying large sums of money to remove asbestos from school
buildings, even where ambient levels are below the threshold of detection.
On the other hand, seat belts and child restraints in cars go relatively
unused despite the minimal cost involved in using them and the significant
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potential for lives saved. This example clearly demonstrates a difference
in willingness-to-pay for an involuntary- versus a voluntarily-assumed
risk.
In another study by Starr (1969), it was concluded that the public
appears to be willing to accept voluntarily-assumed risks that are a thousand
times greater than involuntarily-assumed risks yielding the same benefit.
The implication once again is that the willingness-to-pay for reductions
in involuntarily-assumed risks is greater than the willingness-to-pay for
equal reductions in those risks voluntarily assumed.
Finally, Fischhoff et al . (1979) analyzed a variety of risks and
associated benefits in the context of Starr's analysis and concluded once
again that there is an apparent tendency for individuals to value reductions
in involuntarily-assumed risks more highly than reductions in those risks
voluntarily-assumed. This constitutes the first source of downward bias
in the estimates considered above because the estimates are, presumably,
for voluntarily-assumed risks.
2) Changes in the Probability of Mortality versus Changes in Low-Level
Environmental Risks
The second potential source of bias in the wage-risk premium estimates
concerns the actual reduction in risk realized when a particular environmental
hazard is reduced by some amount. It is reasonable to assume that in
most instances, reducing the level of a specific environmental risk will
result in a reduction in more than simply the probability of mortality.
Many environmental hazards result in significant environmental degra-
dation, e.g., air and water pollution in excess of assimilative capacities.
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These pollution activities in turn pose a substantial threat to the well
being of ecosystems and can lead to morbidity in addition to mortality in
humans. For instance, exclusion of a known carcinogen from a hazardous
waste landfill will entail a reduction in, at a minimum, the probabilities
of environmental damage via the reduced threat of groundwater contamination,
and mortality and morbidity. The implication is that to the extent that
the estimated wage-risk premiums are an accurate measure of the value of
specific changes in the probability of mortality, they will nonetheless
understate the total value of the reduction in most environmental risks.
This constitutes a second major downward bias in the estimates considered. 10
3) Extrapolating From Wage-Risk Premiums
The third potential bias concerns the validity of using linear extrap-
olations to attach values to reductions in risk that differ from those
associated with job-related fatalities. The probability of mortality
considered in wage-risk premium studies assumes a value ranging from
(1 x 10-4) to (1 x 10-5) (Dillingham, 1984). On the other hand, although
there are no firm estimates, the probability of mortality associated with
most low-level environmental risks is usually believed to be much smaller;
on the order of (1 x 10"6) to (1 x 10" 12) or less. This disparity in
risk levels brings into question the relationship between the value of
equal reductions in risks that assume different initial values.
Assume that we are faced with two levels of risk, e.g., probabilities
of mortality, A and B, and that A > B. Intuitively, it would seem likely
that the value of a given reduction in A (RA) would be greater than the
value of the same reduction in B (R B ). That is:
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(10) RA > RB
This is one of the theoretical conclusions of an analysis by Weinstein,
Shepard, and Pliskin (1980). However, research by Raiffa (1969) and others
(Weinstein and Quinn, 1983; and Schoemaker, 1982) suggests that, in fact,
rA < rB.11 if the latter conclusion is correct, and there is empirical
evidence to support it, then linear extrapolations from larger to smaller
initial risk levels may also lead to a downward biased value of a reduction
in risk.
To summarize, the three potential biases discussed above all suggest
that the use of estimated wage-risk premiums will undervalue reductions
in low-level environmental risks. Consequently, assuming that costs are
accurately estimated, use of those estimates will provide a lower bound
on the net benefits that a given policy can be expected to generate. As
more data on the additional benefits, i.e., reductions in non-fatal risks
resulting from the policy, is developed, this information could be combined
with the wage-risk premiums to obtain a more accurate measure of the total
benefits realized.
IV: An Application of the Process
As a means of demonstrating the approach outlined here, consider the
following example. In a recent study, Cuddihy, Griffith, and McClellan
(1984) examined the potential effects of a partial conversion of the light-
duty vehicle fleet in the U.S. from gas- to diesel-powered engines. The
shift to diesel-powered vehicles was assumed to be a likely response to
the demand for increased fuel efficiency by both consumers and government

16
regulation. The primary purpose of the study was to assess the potential
health effects associated with an increase in ambient particulate levels
due to the increased diesel exhaust. The conclusion was that in addition
to generating substantial savings in fuel expenditures, such a changeover
would result in an increased number of lung cancer-related deaths in the
U.S. The analysis was based on a number of assumptions. First, it was
assumed that over roughly a twenty year period the number of diesel-powered
light-duty vehicles will increase from 2% of the total fleet to approximately
20%. Second, it was assumed that the total light-duty fleet size will number
approximately 165,000,000 vehicles at the end of the same time period implying
that roughly 33,000,000 will be diesel-powered. Finally, it was assumed
that diesel-powered vehicles will average approximately 20% greater fuel
efficiency than similar gas-powered vehicles.
In order to assess the net impacts of the projected shift to diesels,
assume that a rule is proposed that would ban the shift from gas- to diesel-
powered vehicles. Consider first the benefits of the suggested rule.
Based on their assumptions, Cuddihy, et al., estimated that approximately
200 additional lung cancer related deaths per year in the U.S. could be
attributed to the projected increase in the use of diesel-powered light-
duty vehicles. On average, and assuming a U.S. population of approximately
235 million people, this increase in the lung cancer mortality rate translates
into an average increase in the probability of mortality from lung cancer
of (8 x 10 - 7). 12 Based on the estimates discussed in Part III above, it
is estimated that, in the aggregate, individuals would be willing to pay
approximately $275 million to $768.9 million per year (in 1979 dollars)
to avoid this increase in the probability of lung cancer-related mortality.
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(The lower and upper bounds of this range are calculated via (9a) and
(9b) respectively.) Recall that this range only takes into account the
benefits of reducing the probability of mortality and ignores any other
health and environmental quality related benefits from the rule which
might accrue.
The primary costs of the rule prohibiting the shift from gas- to
diesel-powered vehicles consist of the reduction in fuel expenditures
foregone adjusted for increased maintenance and purchase costs. Consider
Figure 1. The demand curve (D) represents aggregate demand for transportat
(miles driven) and for simplicity is assumed to be perfectly inelastic
over the relevant range. The supply curve labeled Si reflects the marginal
cost of miles driven. Assuming that fuel, and per mile maintenance and
purchase costs are constant, the supply curve is perfectly elastic as
indicated in Figure 1. Let S\ be the supply curve for miles driven before
the shift from gas to diesel-powered vehicles. If the switch to diesels
is a rational choice, the new supply curve for travel would lie below Sj
such as at S2 reflecting lower cost per mile traveled due to the increased
fuel efficiency of diesel-powered vehicles. The economic gain of the
shift from to S2 is measured by the area (a) and represents an increase
in consumer surplus in the market for transportation. Conversely, the
area (a) measures the cost of not allowing the shift from gas to diesel
powered vehicles.
In 1982 a study of the economic and health impacts of diesel ization
of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet was performed by the National Research
Council (NRC, 1982). Using the NRC study as a base and the assumptions of
Cuddihy, et al., we can estimate the costs of our hypothetical rule as
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Figure 1. Demand and Supply for
Transportation (miles travelled)
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follows. First, using the NRC's estimated average fuel efficiency for
medium sized gas-powered vehicles (assumed here to be an average of all
vehicles), the 20% increase in fuel efficiency for diesels assumed by
Cuddihy, et al
.
, and assuming a constant real price of fuel (gas and diesel)
of $1.25 per gallon we estimate that vehicle owners switching to diesel
would each save approximately $457.22 over a ten year period (discounted
10%, 1980 dollars). Assuming 33,000,000 diesels, this translates to reduced
fuel expenditures of approximately $15,088 million. Next, assuming that
additional maintenance expenses are approximately $20 to $40 per vehicle
per year for 10 years, total additional discounted maintenance costs would
range between $4,055 million and $8,111 million. Finally, assuming that
the price of a diesel vehicle is $300 to $600 greater than that for a
similar gas-powered vehicle, individuals would incur additional expenses
of $6,038 million to $12,166 million. Overall then, the total savings if
consumers substituted diesel-powered for gas-powered vehicles for 20% of
the light-duty fleet, would range between approximately -$5,189 million
and $5,006 million. 13 Conversely, this represents the cost of not allowing
the substitution to take place.
In order to compare the benefits and costs of our hypothetical rule,
we must first adjust the estimated annual benefits to 1980 dollars. Based
on the consumer price index, the estimated annual benefits of 200 lung
cancer related deaths range from $312 million to $872.7 million per year.
Assuming a 10% discount rate, the present value of such benefits accrued
over 10 years would then range between $1,917 million and $ 5,362.4 million.
In those cases where the application of the approach considered here
yields a lower-bound estimate of benefits that exceeds the upper-bound

20
estimate of costs, further study of the rule would not be necessary.
Based upon the figures presented here, it is not possible to conclude
with certainty whether the net benefits of our proposed rule are indeed
positive. However, the figures do suggest that further examination of
the rule would be warranted. Moreover, we feel that this example is a
good demonstration of the potential usefulness of the approach to benefits
estimation being considered here.
IV: Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the potential for using previous
studies of wage-risk premiums to attach values to the potential benefits
of policies designed to reduce low-level environmental risks. The need for
considering such an approach derives from the increasing demand for supporting
economic analyses of the expected impacts (benefits and costs) of proposed
government regulations. Our conclusion is that the use of these estimated
wage-risk premiums holds considerable promise as a viable first step in
assessing the benefits of policies designed to reduce the level of specific
environmental risks. This conclusion rests on three points; 1) the immediacy
of the situation, 2) the relationship of the wage-risk premiums to a theor-
etical treatment of the problem, and 3) the generally downward biased
nature of the estimated benefits generated via this approach. These three
points are considered in order.
First, policy makers are currently faced with the dilemma of enacting
regulations in a relatively short period of time while simultaneously
ensuring that the benefits of such rules can be expected to exceed the
costs incurred. This is especially true in areas such as hazardous waste
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disposal. However, there is scant information on how the public values
policies such as these, and as a consequence a proxy for the benefits of
such policies is needed.
Second, according to the theoretical model developed in Part II,
individuals' valuations of reductions in risk can be thought of in terms
of the amount of other goods they are willing to forego. Wage-risk premiums
can be thought of as a proxy for this measure. To the extent that wages
foregone to reduce risk leads to a decrease in consumption of goods and
services, the measures are similar.
In Part III it was shown that wage-risk premiums are, by and large,
downward biased estimates of the actual value of the benefits associated
with reductions in low-level environmental risks. This implies that cost-
benefit analyses utilizing these estimates can be expected to be biased
in the direction of underestimating the actual level of net benefits real-
ized. Hence the error of a false positive is minimized. In those instance
where costs are estimated to exceed benefits by a small amount, the decision
maker will be faced with the task of determining the likelihood that the
additional benefits that can be expected to obtain would lead to benefits
greater than costs. The fact that the estimates being used are downward
biased could help guide their decisions in these situations as well.
The practice being suggested here is intended as a means of providing
short-run input into the analysis of policies where the benefits of risk
reduction is an important consideration. We feel that it could be especially
useful in those instances where a number of different policy alternatives
to a particular problem are being considered. Utilizing these numbers,
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those alternatives that offer the greatest potential in terms of net benefits
could be selected for additional, more costly analysis.
Endnotes
1. This approach was also considered by the EPA in the development of its
guidelines for completing regulatory impact analyses (Fisher, 1984).
While the intent was to use these figures to approximate the benefits of
reductions in the probability of mortality the concept was dropped in the
final version of the guidelines. This approach is also considered in Violette
and Chestnut (1983), and Ehrenberg and Smith (1985).
2. Note that (1) could easily be modified to accomodate any particular
environmental risk.
3. While this treatment of risk reduction as a purchasable good is not
strictly applicable to all possible situations, we feel that it is justified
to the extent that additional reductions in risk require the sacrifice of
other goods and services (including public goods). This approach is also
employed in Freeman (1979).
4. P(M) used here is defined as in Equation (1). In the present model
one could think of P(M) as a function of the aggregate amount of good Q,
Q, actually purchased. Since price taking behavior is implicitly assumed,
the individual does not percieve that they can impact Q.
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5. The value of the incremental reduction is arbitrary and may be set at
any level, say for example (1 x 10~6) . However, if the purpose of the
analysis is to compare the net benefits of different policy alternatives,
once an increment is selected it must be held constant across the various
policy options being considered in order to make valid comparisons.
6. As indicated in the text, Dillingham was interested in the effect of
the risk-variable definition on the value of the estimated wage-risk premium.
The data on the human-capital and control variables used by Dillingham
were taken from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey conducted by the
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The risk measures
are based on data from the U.S. Department of Labor or were constructed
by Dillingham in earlier work. Finally, most of the risk measures have
been used in other wage-risk premium studies (Dillingham, 1984).
7. The justification for the use of this range rests on the assumption
that the data used by Dillingham (1984) can be considered to be as good
or better than that employed in similar studies. As noted in Dillingham,
the data in the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey contained new and improved
information about work and specific workers. As noted in Smith (1979)
many of the other studies were forced to use data sets constructed by
matching average job characteristics to individuals. Smith notes that
this introduces an errors-in-variables problem that tends to bias tests
against finding wage-risk premiums.
8. Violette and Chestnut (1983) also noted a number of these biases.
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9. A fourth potential bias concerns the degree to which the wage-risk
premiums considered here reflect only the value of the probability of
mortality. This potential bias is cited in Violette and Chestnut (1983)
where it is noted specification error in the equations used to estimate
the wage-risk premiums could lead to an over-estimate of the value of a
given reduction in the probability of mortality. However, to date there
is no empirical evidence to support or refute this possibility.
10. We should stress that we are not suggesting that the estimation of the
benefits of reductions in non-fatal risks should be ignored. Rather, the
methodology suggested here is meant to serve as a "first-pass" approach
that could eventually be supplemented by estimates of the benefits of
reductions in the associated non-fatal risks. It also needs to be noted
that the specification error referred to in note 9 above could also have
an influence.
11. One of the reasons for this possibility offered in the studies cited
concerns what is referred to as the "certainty effect". The argument is
that people may value a given reduction in risk more highly when the reduction
is more certain to result in a favorable outcome, e.g., when the initial
level of risk is low to begin with.
12. The distributional impacts of the increase in the probability of mortality
would fall disproportionately on the U.S. population with the largest
impact falling on workers in urban expressways and street canyons. However,
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treating the effect as equal across the population does not affect the
value of the estimated benefits derived below.
13. The lower bound of -$5,189 million in savings is unrealistic in that
consumers would not be acting rationally if they did shift to 20% diesels.
A more realistic lower bound on the range of potential savings would be $0.
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